This paper describes a statistical model of equilibrium behavior in games, which we call Quanta! Response Equilibrium (QRE). The key feature of the equilibrium is that individuals do not always play best responses to the strategies of their opponents, but play better strategies with higher probability than worse strategies. We illustrate several different applicat . ions of this approach, and establish a number of theoretical properties of this equilibrium concept. We also demonstrate an equivalence between this equilibrium notion and Bayesian games derived from games of complete information with perturbed payoffs. JEL classification numbers: 026, 211
Introduction
It is well known that the data from experimental games regularly show systematic de partures from the most basic predictions of standard game theory. This is true even in the simplest imaginable games, such as two person bimatrix zero sum games with unique mixed strategy equilibrium (O'Neill 1987 , Brown and Rosenthal 1990 , Ochs 1995 . When games have multiple equilibrium, then conventional wisdom typically places further re strictions on the data, such as the restrictions implied by subgame perfection, and the news is even worse Tietz 1990, Thaler 1988 ). The evidence is overwhelming that, at least as a predictive model of behavior, the standard theory of equilibrium in games needs an overhaul. The need of doing this is made even more urgent since we are already regularly apply traditional game theory as a predictive tool.1
One possible response is to abandon Nash equilibrium entirely and explain these devi ations in terms of psychological theories of behavior. This is not what we are proposing here. While judgement biases, and other sources of deviations from rational behavior surely play some role ill. these departures, there is still a need to study models of the equilibrium interaction of these effects. Initial attempts at this (McKelvey and Palfrey *We acknowledge support of National Science Fo undation Grant No. SBR-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. A version of this paper was presented at the First Japanese Decentralization Conference at Keio University in November, 1994 . We are grateful to the warm hospitality during that conference, and appreciate the comments received from the audience. The second author thanks the Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle and CERAS for research support and hospitality. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El Gamal, Jacques-Franc;ois Thisse, and Mark Fey, and the research assistance of Euge:ne Grayver and Rob Weber.
1There are countless examples of this. One obvious one is mechanism design, which has applications to in the design of incentives structures for firms and regulatory agencies, the design of auction and bargaining mechanisms, and public good provision. We also use game theory to make policy prescriptions for government intervention in imperfectly competitive industries, and in fact this has probably been the most significant trend in the field of industrial organization in the last couple of decades. More recently, game theoretic predictions have been applied to a variety of issues that arise in the study of international trade. In fact, if one goes back further, to the 1950's when the first surge of research in game theory began, the bulk of the research was largely motivated (and funded) by applications to arms races and other problems of international conflict and national security.
(1992), El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey (1993, 1994) ) have sought to explain system atic deviations from Nash equilibrium by presuming the existence of specific types of players who do not seek to maximize their expected payoffs in the experimental games.
While this approach (and also the application of psychological theories of bias) have had success in explaining some of the departures from Nash equilibrium, they are both open to the criticism of being post hoc, in the sense that the "invention" of types is specific to the game under consideration. What would be more desirable is a general model that does not need to be specially modified for each game and each dataset. This paper presents one such class of general models. We consider a very simple ex tension of the standard model of Nash equilibrium which can explain some of systematic violations of Nash equilibrium. The basic idea is that there are many different possible "types" of players, and that the statistical variation in behavior that is always observed in experiments is due to some underlying distribution of these types. As a result, behav ior will be stochastic, even if all agents have private information about their type and always adopt pure strategies. More importantly, because of the game setting, players will respond to anticipated errors of opponents in ways which can lead to systematic deviations from Nash equilibrium.
We introduce this idea first in its "reduced form" which supposes that individual be havior is not perfectly optimal. Specifically, given a set of alternative choices, individuals choose probabilistically, choosing better alternatives more often than worse alternatives. The Nash equilibrium model thus corresponds to an extreme special case of this model, in which the probability of choosing an optimal alternative is equal to one. Thus our model specifies a choice probability function that depends on the vector of expected utilities of all available choices.
In a game, the available choices to a player are given by his or her strategy set. The expected utility of each strategy for a player is determined by the probability distribution of the strategies of the other players of the game. Thus, the choice probability function in our model is a generalization of the "Best Response Correspondence" in game theory. We simply call it a Quanta! Response Function, and assume it is continuous and . positively responsive to the expected payoff of each strategy. A Quantal Response Equilibrium is a fixed point of the quantal response functions, just as a Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the best response correspondence.
We then narrow our focus to a particular class of response functions associated with the logit model of choice. Each individual is assumed to have the same logit response parameter (which indexes how close it is to the standard best response model). We term the quantal response equilibria of this parametric model, Logit Equilibria. Given a particular game, we then define the logit equilibrium correspondence for that game as a function of the logit parameter. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995a) establishes a number of technical properties of the logit equilibrium correspondence. We summarize them here and illustrate these properties with a series of examples.
There are a number of models of subrational behavior in games that are related to quantal response equilibrium. Rosenthal (1989) and Chen, Friedman, and Thisse (1995) explore models which also look at fixed points of statistical response functions. Van Damme (1987) presents a model in which it is costly for players to adopt pure strategies. This "control cost" model generates statistical response functions. Schmidt (1992) investigates games of reputation building in which players choose an optimal strategy with probability c and a suboptimal strategy with probability 1 -E, solves for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game, when this is common knowledge among the players, and applies this to the analysis of experimental chain-store-paradox games. Zauner (1993) models behavior in the . centipede game by introducing Normally distributed payoff disturbances to the agent form of the game and then computes the resulting Bayesian equilibrium. This is essentially the same as looking at a quantal . response equilibrium with "Probit" response curves. 2 Stahl and Wilson (1995) apply a version of the logit equilibrium model to analyze data from a series of experimental two person games they conducted. Beja (1992) proposes a model of imperfectly rational play in games, where players are limited in their ability to exactly implement their strategy choices. Ma and Manove (1993) apply a similar idea to study bargaining games when the players' cannot perfectly implement their bargaining strategies. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the formal struc ture of the model for normal form games. In sections 2 and 3, we discuss the theoretical foundations of quantal response equilibrium, and show how it can be interpreted as a Bayesian equilibrium with Harsanyi-type payoff disturbances. Section 4 presents a para metric family of quantal response models, based on logit response curves. We call this the logit equilibrium. Section 5 shows how the logit equilibrium correspondence implies refinements of Nash equilibrium. We then apply this refinement to a simple bargaining game called "The Ultimatum Game." Section 6 discusses a number of extensions of the basic model: infinite strategy spaces, games of incomplete information, heterogeneity, en dogenizing the response curves, and games in extensive form. We make some concluding remarks in section 7.
The Model
We begin by defining a game in its normal form in the standard way. Let I = {1, .. . , n} be the set of players. For each i E I there is a strategy set Ai, which we assume to be finite, with Ji elements. Each player has a payoff function ui : A -r R where A = IL E I Ai Let Si be the set of probability distributions over Ai and an element si E Si is a mixed strategy. Given a strategy profiles E S = Il iEJ Si player i's expected payoff is Vi(s) = La E A p(a)ui(a), where p(a) = rriE J si(ai). A (mixed) strategy profile s E sis a Nash Equilibrium if, for all i EI and for all ti E Si, vi(s) � vi(ti, s_i)· We next define a response fu nction � ' which, for a given player i, maps a vector of 2For an analysis of centipede games with logit response curves, see Fey, McKelvey, and Palfrey (forthcoming) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1995b) .
payoffs for each possible pure strategy into a mixed strategy for i. That is, � : 'RJ; -+.Si·
We denote the probability assigned to strategy aij by �j· A special case of a response function is the Best Response Fu nction, which is multivalued and upper hemicontinuous, but not continuous. Here we wish to restrict attention to response functions that are single-valued and continuous. Given a set of response functions, R = Ri , ... , R1 , one for each player, and given a normal form game, (I, S, u), one can define an equilibrium relative to Ras a fixed point of the following mapping from S to S. For any givens ES, �(vi(s)) maps si into a new element of Si. Since u is continuous ins, Ris a continuous function mapping a compact convex set into itself, and therefore has at least one fixed point. We call any such fixed point a R-response equilibrium of the game (I, S, u) .
3
Foundations of R-Resp. onse Equilibria
The basic.idea that choice probabilities are related in a continuous and monotonic way to expected payoffs has been around a long time. It was first formalized in the mathematical psychology literature (Thurstone 1927 , Luce 1959 , Luce and Suppes 1965 where it was applied to the study of data from individual choice experiments. The new dimension in applying the model to game theory is that the choice probabilities of one player affect the expected utilities of the other players' choice alternatives, so that the choice prob abilities themselves are endogenously determined. That is, random individual behavior has equilibrium effects.
There are a number of ways to think about the adoption by players of responses that are not necessarily "best" responses. Two immediately come to mind. First one could interpret this as a departure from rationality by the players. In this sense, the model falls into the class of "bounded rationality" models. This is the interpretation given in Rosenthal (1989) and Chen, Friedman, and Thisse (1995) , and, as they point out, is the basic motivation behind the large literature in mathematical psychology called "proba bilistic choice." The idea here is that behavior is subject to choice errors (i.e., nonoptimal choice) by individuals, but these choice errors have a specific relationship to the true ex pected payoffs: "big" mistakes (i.e., involving a large loss of utility relative to the optimal choice) are made less often than little mistakes.
An alternative interpretation of smoothed best responses is consistent with standard game theory, following results by Harsanyi (1973) about Bayesian equilibria of games of incomplete information. The basic idea there is to think of the game (I, S, u) as a complete-information approximation of a more complicated game of incomplete informa tion, in which the actual payoffs of the players are private information. These · actual payoffs are equal to the payoffs given by (I, S, u), but .include additive disturbances from a known distribution. The disturbances to player i's payoffs are known only to i. · This generates a game of incomplete information with player types determined by the individual-specific payoff disturbances.
This second interpretation is the basis for the model developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995a) , and is also related to the random-utility interpretation of randomness in discrete choice developed in the econometrics literature (see McFadden, 1976 .) The idea here is to interpret the random disturbances as latent variables which cannot be observed by an outsider (say an econometrician or another player in the game). However, each player is assumed to observe the sum of this latent variable and the true payoff. In this sense, one can think of the perturbed payoffs as simply being each player's estimate of the expected utility of a particular strategy, with the latent variable representing the estimation error. This is formalized below.
For each i and each j E {1, . . . , Ji}, and for any s ES, denote by Vij(s) the expected utility to i of adopting the pure strategy aij when the other players use B-i· For each pure strategy aij, player i does not receive payoff Vij(s) but instead receives: Player i's profile of payoff disturbances, ci = (cii, ... , ciJ.), is distributed according to a joint distribution with density fu nction fi(ci)· Assume that the marginal distribution of Ji exists for each cij and E(ci) = 0. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995a) call J = (!1, ... , J n ) admissible if Ji satisfies the above properties for all i. The assumed choice behavior is that each player chooses strategy aii such that Vij 2 Vik Vk = 1, ... , Ji. Given this choice behavior, v and J induces a distribution over the actual choices by each player,. To be more specific, for any v, define Bij(v) as the set of realizations of ci such that strategy aij has the highest estimated (or disturbed) expected payoff. So
is the induced probability that player i will select strategy j given v. Since P( v) E S and v = v(s) is defined for any s E S, Po v(s) = P(v(s)) defines a mapping from S into itself. Any fixed point s* such that s* = P(v(s*)) is called a Quantal Response Equilibrium of the game (I, A, u) .
The following results are immediate, and the proofs are left to the reader:
• For any admissible f, the mapping P o v a continuous response function
• For any admissible f, the mapping P o v has a fixed point
• Given f, a quantal response equilibrium is a R-Response Equilibrium, where R = P
4
Specific parametric models of R-Response Equilib-
Here we describe three different models of response equilibrium, which differ in their assumptions about the shape of the R function that maps the vector of expected payoffs to an agent into a vector of choice probabilities. The first was proposed by Rosenthal (1989) and is simply a linear response model which applies to games in which players have only two strategies. The second two are derived from the logit model of individual choice.
Linear Response Model
Rosenthal's (1989) T-equilibrium was developed as a model of boundedly rational be havior in games where players have only two strategies. That model specifies that the probability an individual adopts a particular strategy is a linearly increasing function of the difference between the expected payoff of that strategy and the expected payoff of the other strategy. If the t:wo strategies yield the same expected payoff (given the choice probabilities of the other players) then each is used with probability �· More generally,
.if Pi1 = min{maxO, .5 + B(vi1 -Vi2), 1} and Pi2 = 1 -P i i, where Bis a nonnegative constant representing the degree of rationality of the players. As B approaches infinity, the linear response model approaches the Nash equilibrium.
Smooth Response Models
There are a number of possible examples of models using R functions that are smooth.
One is the Luce model (Luce 1959) , in which the odds of using one strategy as opposed to another strategy are proportional to the ratio of the expected utility of the strategies. This, and a generalization of it, where the odds are given by the ratio of expected utilities taken to some (nonnegative) power, µ, is examined by Chen, Friedman, and Thisse (1995) .
An alternative model (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995a , for a technical analysis of its properties) is the logit model where the odds are determined by the exponential function of the utilities times a given nonnegative constant, A. Specifically:
This response function arises from the assumption that the distribution fi(ci) of payoff errors follows a type I extreme value distribution, with cumulative density function
F(cij) = e-e •J, where the varepsilonij are independent. This distribution of errors is assumed in much of the discrete choice econometrics literature (see McFadden, 1973 McFadden, , 1976 . Here, the parameter A plays the same role as B in the linear model. As A approaches infinity, the model of behavior approaches the best response model. When A = 0 behavior is essentially random, as all strategies are played with equal probability.
The quantal response equilibrium in this model is given by a vector of choice probabilities, one for each player, (s1, ... , si, ... , s 1 ) such that, for each i EI and for each aij E A 1
where
This produces a system of J = { '£ {= 1 Ji} equations, and it is easy to prove that this system always has a solution for any value A E [ O, oo) ((McKelvey and Palfrey 1995a) . Any such point is called a logit equilibrium for A. The set of all (A, s) such that s solves the above equation is called the Logistic Equilibrium Correspondence. Moreover, any limit .Point of a sequence of Logit Equilibria as A approaches infinity is a Nash equilibrium of the undedying game.
5

Properties of logit equilibria
Logit equilibria have a number of properties that are different than Nash equilibrium predictions.
5.1
Use of dominated strategies A Nash equilibrium cannot use a strongly dominated strategy with positive probability. Various equilibrium refinements typically eliminate any Nash equilibria that use weakly dominated strategies. In contrast, a logit equilibrium uses every strategy with positive probability. The probability of adopting a strongly dominated strategy goes to zero as >. goes to infinity. However weakly dominated strategies can be used with positive probability even in the limit, as is shown in examples later in this paper.
Mixed strategy equilibria
It is a property of mixed strategy Nash equilibria that the mixing probabilities do not depend on the players own payoffs over outcomes in the support of the equilibrium, but only on the other players' payoffs . Since a player is by definition indifferent between all strategies in the support of the mixed equilibrium, the only reason for mixing correctly is to keep the other players at the Nash equilibrium. In the logit equilibrium, in contrast, the mixing probabilities depend on the players' own payoffs. To see this, consider the game of Table 1 , where x > 0. Let p represent the probability the row player chooses "U", and q represent the probability that the column player chooses "L" . This game has a unique Nash equilibrium at To see what the logit equilibrium looks like, set r = � ands = �· The equations for a logit equilibrium can then be written as and 
(Note for O < ). < oo the denominator and the left hand side must be positive. So the numerator must also be positive). Now, substituting into the second equation, and then differentiating, we get that the derivative r' of r with respect to x is
Since all terms in the fractions are positive whenever x 2: 0 and ).. > 0, it follows that r'
(and hence p ' = (l�' r)2) is positive. Thus, for the logit equilibrium, the mixing probability is a function of the player's own payoff. Fo r all values of 0 < ).. < oo, the probability of player 1 choosing "U" increases as x increases.
5.3
Payoff magnitude effects
Since any game theoretic analysis starts from the assumption that utilities are expressed as Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, it is a property of game theory, and hence of any Nash equilibrium that predictions are unaffected by changes in the magnitude and scale of the utility f unction. Thus, any game theoretic analysis seems unable to ac. count for payoff magnitude effects.
Since the logit equilibrium is a Bayesian equilibrium, the same conclusion applies here, as long as the same transformation is applied to the payoffs of the game and the payoff due to the error terms. However, if the payoff from the error arises from considerations outside of the game, then a change in magnitude of the game payoffs would affect the utilities in the game, but not the utilities contributing to the error term. In this situation, the prediction of the logit equilibrium would change.
To see how the logit equilibrium predictions would change, note that in the logistic equation for Pij( vi), >. and Vij always enter as scalar multiples of each other. Thus, multiplying all utilities by a constant is equivalent to multiplying >. by a constant. Thus, if the precision parameter of the error term is >., and all of the game utilities (for all players) are multiplied by a factor of a, then the resulting logit equilibrium would be the same as a logit equilibrium for the original game under the assumption that the precision is a>.. It follows from results to be shown below, that in general this would imply that higher payoffs would lead to outcomes "closer" to Nash behavior. The case when the magnitudes for one player are changed, and the other player are not is not so clear cut. Here, multiplying one player's utilities by a constant while the other players were unchanged would be equivalent to introducing an individualized precision >.i for that player, where >.i = a>.. We discuss these effects again later in the context of heterogeneity of errors.
6 Refinements· of Nash equilibrium implied . by the logit equilibrium Following Harsanyi (1973) , call a Nash equilibrium, a * , approachable if there exists a sequence of >. ' s approaching infinity and a corresponding sequence of logit equilibria that converges to a * . It is easy to show that this set is non-empty, since the logit equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. The set of approachable equilibria thus defines a refinement of .Nash equilibrium. A final property .of logit equilibria is that it defines (for almost all games) a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibrium. For small enough vafoes of >., it can be shown that there is a unique logit equilibrium close to the "centroid" of the game. This is the point where all strategies are adopted with equal probability. We define the principal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence to be the branch which starts at the centroid. For generic games, the principal branch is a one dimensional manifold, and hence can be followed for values of >. ranging from 0 to infinity.3 The limit point of the principal branch as >. approaches infinity is called the logit solution of the game and is denoted u;,. Thus the logit equilibrium correspondence can be used to define one weak refinement (approachability) and one strong refinement (the logit solution).
We illustrate these ideas in a few simple examples below.4
Example: The asymmetric game of chicken
The first example is an asymmetric version of the game of chicken. If both players play "soft" then they each get an intermediate payoff. If they both play tough they. both get very low payoffs. If they choose different strategies, then the tough player receives a very large payoff, and the soft player receives a low payoff. The payoffs are given below, in Table 2. tough soft tough 0,0 6,1 soft 1,14 2,2 In this game there are three Nash equilibria, two corresponding to pure strategy equilibria where one player is tough and the other is soft, and the third corresponding to both players mixing. Usual refinements provide no help in selecting among equilibria. Figure 1 displays the logit equilibrium correspondence for this game. As one can see, the weak refinement of approachability by a sequence of logit equilibria does not provide any help, as all three equilibria are approached · by logit equilibria. The unique component of the equilibrium graph converges to the pure strategy equilibrium where the row player plays soft and the column player plays tough. This is the equilibrium favoring the player (column)' who benefits the most from playing tough. In fact this would seem to be a general property. 5 of the class of asymmetric chicken games where the only asymmetry is in the payoff to the tough player when one player is tough and the other is soft. The logit solution always picks out the pure strategy equilibrium favoring the player benefitting the most from being tough.
The second example is a very simple version of a bargaining game that has become known as "The Ultimatum Game" (see Tietz 1988 and Thaler 1988) . It has been 3The basic idea and the mathematical tools needed to prove this are similar to the "tracing procedure" of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . But the selection that is made by the two solutions is different.
4The interested reader should also see the papers by Chen, Friedman, and Palfrey (1995a) , which give a number of other examples. 5We do not have a formal proof of this, but all the solutions we have computed have this property.
A similar property appears to hold for asyml!letric Battle of the Sexes games. Figure 1: QRE Correspondence for game of Chicken. Probability of "tough" for row player (top graph) and column player (bottom graph) the subject of a great deal of experimental work by both economists and psychologists, largely because the results strongly contradict the predictions of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this game, there are two players, who are given the task of dividing a fixed sum of money according to the following simple rules. Player 1 offers a split of the money, and then Player 2 either accepts or rejects the proposed division. If the offer is rejected by Player 2, the game ends and neither player receives anything. Assume for the purposes . of analysis that there are a finite number of feasible splits6 (say, in one dollar increments). Then subgame perfect Nash equilibrium implies that Player 2 will receive, in equilibrium, either 0 or the lowest possible positive amount.
A simplified version of the ultimatum game is easy to study in the context of the logit model. In this simplified version of the game7, the pie consists of 21 dollars and there are 1 permissible splits of the pie, ranging from the 50/50 split (where each player receives 1 dollars) and the most favorable split for player 1, subject to the constraint that player 2 receives a positive amount. (I.e., Player 1 receives 21 -1 dollars and Player 2. receives 1 dollar.) The second player writes down a minimum acceptable offer (some number between 1 and 1). If Player 1 offers at lea.st this .minimum level, then the outcome is exactly the proposed split. If not, then both players receive 0. The normal form of this game is given below in Table 3 . It is well known that this game has multiple Nash equilibria (in fact a continuum of Nash equilibria), only one of which is trembling hand perfect. In the perfect equilibrium, Player 1 offers (5, 1) and Player 2 chooses the third strategy (accept anything). Figure 2 shows the unique continuous selection from the logit equilibrium correspondence for val-. ues of>. ranging from 0 to 10. This shows clearly that the logit solution to this game is not the unique perfect equilibrium, but rather results in the ( 4, 2) split. Player 2 does not adopt a pure strategy, but rather mixes evenly between the choices of "accept anything" and "reject only the worst offer." In addition to the limiting properties of this logit equi librium mapping, it is also instructive to look at the solution for low and intermediate values of >.. At low values of >. both players are nearly random, so the optimal strategy for Player 1 is actually the 50/50 split. Accordingly, for sufficiently small >. this is the modal offer. The probability of using the strategy of making the greediest offer declines very quickly in >.. For higher values of>., the modal offer becomes (4, 2). For Player 2, the strategy of accepting only the equal split disappears very quickly. Of course with only three strategies for each player it is difficult to tell whether or not the modal strategy in the logit solution will be close to the perfect equilibrium. To extend this example, consider the 6 x 6 version of the game, illustrated in Table 4 below. 1 6,6 6,6 6,6 7,5 7,5 7,5 8,4 8,4 8,4 9,3 9,3 9,3 0,0 10,2 10,2 0,0 0,0 11,1 Table 4 : The 6 x 6 simplified ultimatum game. Figure 3 shows the unique connected component of the logit equilibrium graph. The · logit solution is now the (9, 3) split. As in the 3 x 3 version of the game, the modal offer begins with the equal split, and as ,\ increases, the modal offer progressively increases until it finally settles at the (9, 3) split. An interesting theoretical question would be what the logit solution for the equilibrium split converges to (as a fraction of 2J), as J goes to infinity. Many applications to economics involve games with infinite strategy spaces, private in formation, and sequential play. This includes, for example, voluntary contribution games in the provision of public goods, auctions, bargaining, principal agent models, oligopoly, spatial competition, and so.forth . Here. we explain how the logit model can be extended to accommodate these different applications. Other parametric models of smooth response functions can be extended in a similar fashion
Infinite Strategy Spaces
If strategy spaces are infinite8, then the probability of adopting any particular pure strategy will be zero. However, it is possible to retain the basic idea that the odds of one strategy vs. another strategy are given by the ratio of an exponential function · of the expected utility of each strategy. That is, we still want it to be the case that, for_any a, a' E Ai, the ratio, is given by:
. Thus, p(a) is given by:
e >. v a p(a)/p(a') = e>-va' e>-v a p(a) = IA ; e >-v tdt as long as IA; e>-v tdt is well-defined. In general, if Ai is infinite, then it may or may not be possible to define a probability distribution function (density function) p(a) satisfying this logit condition for all a, a' E Ai. It depends on whether or not the integral of e >-v a with respect to the Lebeague measure is guaranteed to be finite. We restrict p(a) to be a measurable function. Further assumptions are needed on the game to ensure that the logit response f u nction is well-behaved.
For . example, if Ai is a compact subset of n n and the underlying payoff function of the game is continuous, then IA ; e>-v 1dt is well-defined. There are some additional technical issues that must also be addressed, as discussed in some of the literature on the econometrics of probabilistic choice models.
.2 Games of Incomplete Information
If players have private information, represented by Type Sets, (T1, ••• , T1 ) , and type contingent beliefs, 7ri(ti) which specify Player i ' s beliefs about the types of the other players. Then the.extension of:strategies,.is a Type-Gentingent {Mixed) Strategy, which, for each player, maps Ti into S i . Such a strategy will be denoted CTi and, for each t E Ti and for each aij E Ai, aij(t) denotes the probability player i plays strategy aij under ai. Payoffs may depend on the entire profile of types, as well as the profile of actions. The 8Some natural applications include oligopoly and spatial competition. Some of these are studied in the context of a generalized version of Luce's random choice model in Friedman, Thisse, and Palfrey ( 1995) .
extension of Nash equilibrium to this kind of game is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and a similar extension is possible for the logit equilibrium (or, more generally, quantal response equilibrium). Given a strategy profile a, this implies an effective mixed strategy Si for each player, which is a probability distribution over Ai, where the probability of strategy ai j just given by
If the type space is finite, then the definition is the same, except the integral is replaced by a finite sum over the types in T i . Given an effective mixed strategy profile, s, the probability each type of each player assigns to each strategy is given by the logit equation below:
Where vi( s) is defined as before. Then, given the parameter, >.,·a logit equilibrium is any a satisfying the above system of simultaneous logit equations where s is the effective mixed strategy under a. It is straightforward to show in the case of finite T that a logit equilibrium exists for any game and for any nonnegative value of >., and that the logit equilibrium correspondence has the same properties as in the model for games with complete information. If T is a compact rectangle in R n then we also have existence, under appropriate regularity conditions on the joint distribution of types. We illustrate this equilibrium for the following public goods game, which has been studied extensively in experiments by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1992 , 1993 , 1994 .9
Example: Voluntary provision of a binary public good.
There are I players, each of whom is endowed with a single indivisible unit of private good. Each player independently decides whether to "contribute" their unit of private good toward the production of the public good. If at least K �I units are contributed, then the public good is provided. (Unused contributions are not rebated.) Each player values the public good the same (which we normalize at 1). Each player's valuation of their discrete unit of the private good is private information, and this value is . denoted by ci, which we call i's contribution cost. These valuations are independently drawn from a commonly known probability distribution denoted F(c). The payoff function to player i is thus given as follows: Ui = 1 + c if i does not contribute and at least K others contribute 9See also the theoretical analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) . ui = 1 if i contributes and at least K -1 others contribute ui = c if i does not contribute and fewer than K others contribute ui = 0 if i contributes and fewer than K -1 others contribute For this example, assume that the distribution of costs is uniform over the interval [0, 1.5], N = 3 and K = 2. A symmetric Bayesian equilibrium is represented by a cutpoint strategy, c*, according to which each individual contributes if and only if their contribution cost is less than or equal to c*. It is easy to see that such a cutpoint must equal the probability that an individual's contribution is critical to the production of the public good, given that the other players are adopting the same cutpoint decision rule. 1 0 For this example, the pivotal condition reduces to: c* = 2c*(l -c*)/2.25
There are two Bayesian equilibria of this game, one in which no one ever contributes, i.e., c* = 0 (which can be shown to be unstable) and another in which c* = .375, which produces an effective mixed strategy of each player contributing with probability .25.
The logit equilibrium is not a cutpoint equilibrium since, for every contribution cost, and for every value of A, the probability of contribution must lie strictly between 0 and 1. Fixing A, this defines a function assigning a probability of contribution to each value of c. Call this f u nction P( c). Then define: Notice that the probability of contribution is greater than the Bayesian equilibrium ( .25) for all values of A. This is interesting because it is consistent with similar exper imental findings (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1991 , 1993 where contribution levels in 10In some cases, but not in this example, an equilibrium of always contributing regardless of one's contribution cost may exist, in which case, the probability of being pivotal must be greater than or equal to the upper bound on the distribution of costs. This could happen for example if N = K and the maximum value of c were less than 1. this game were systematically greater than the Bayesian equilibrium contribution levels. They reported that extent of overcontribution varied considerably depending on the ex act values of K, N, and the distribution of costs. For example, less overcontribution is observed in a similar game in which K is reduced from 2 to 1. The logit equilibrium graph of this variation is shown as the lighter curve in Figure 4 . Notice that it converges much more rapidly as a function of >. for this variation of the game, suggesting a possible theoretical explanation for this apparent anomaly.
LOGIT EQUILIBRIUM
Heterogeneity
The models described above, including the extensions, assume that all players have the same parameter, >..11 However, there are good reasons to believe that many situations correspond to environments in which different players' response functions are different.
The simplest way to model this is to assume that different players have different values of >.. As an example, consider a chess game between an expert and a beginner. If this were common knowledge, then the expert might adopt a different strategy than she would against .4:1.nother expert. The same might be true -of two bargainers, one who is very experienced at negotiation and the other who is not. Such an example might be the haggling that often occurs at flea markets between the sellers (who are typically very experienced at haggling) and the buyers (many of whom frequent flea markets only occasionally). As a third example, if one were to apply this model to entry deterrence by a monopolist, one might wish to assume that the entrant has a lower value of>. than the incumbent. Finally, some experiments have been conducted using subjects of different levels of experience, and it would be reasonable to assume that the more experienced players have higher >.'s.
Example: Illustration of heterogeneity
Consider the game of Table 1 , setting x = 4 .. This is similar to an experimentai game reported in Ochs (1995) .
In Figure 5 , we graph the logit equilibria of this game, first under the assumption of homogeneous >. Player 1: probability of Up We see from the figure that the decreased accuracy of player 2 results in that player staying closer to random behavior and further from the Nash equilibrium for all ·values of >.. This also results in an adjustment to player 1 ' s strategy. Since player 1 expects player 2 to be less -accurate, he -can now take advantage of the fact that player 2 is playing L too frquently, and adopt U with higher probability than the Nash prediction of �· In principle, one could extend the model of heterogeneity even further, by dropping the assumption that the profile of >.'s is common knowledge among the players. One 12Notice that this is equivalent to the logit equilibria in which all payoff of Player 2 are multiplied by a factor of t.
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alternative would be to assume that each player's A is drawn from a commonly known distribution.
.4
Endogenizing A
The question of heterogeneity leads a step further to the more general issue of what determines the level of A. There are at least two possibilities which are both worth further consideration, but are beyond the scope of this paper. The first is that,· if one interprets A as a measure of how carefully a player is making the decision, then it may make sense to treat A as a choice variable, rather than taking it to be exogenous. Smith and Walker [1993] use a model like this to explain departures from individual decision making, in which there is a tradeoff between costly effort of making an optimal choice and the expected utility gain from being careful. This model, or something like it, could be extended by imposing the logit equilibrium conditions. A second way to endogenize A is to construct specific learning models, which could explicitly model the changes in A resulting from experience. As history of past play accumulates, then players should be better able to estimate the expected payoffs, at least for those strategies that have been used in the past. This would produce stochastic versions of models that have been looked at in the past, such as fictitious play, cournot dynamics, and linear adjustment processes.
Games in extensive form
A number of interesting new issues arise in the application of the logit equilibrium to extensive form games. The technical de . tails, as well as a variety of applications to experimental games, are discussed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995b) .
We begin by defining a game in its extensive form in the standard way. Let I = {O, 1, ... , I} be the set of players, with (player "O") called nature. The game is repre sented by :
• a set of nodes, with elements x E X
• an initial node, denoted x0
• a set of terminal nodes Z � X
• an immediate precedence relation P defined on X x X representing branches. If xPx' then x immediately precedes x' and x' immediately follows x. P is asymmetric and acyclic.
• a partition of the non-terminal nodes, X -Z, into I+ 1 subesets, x0,X1, .•• ,X 1 , with X0 called Nature's moves and X i called the moves of player i.
• for each x E X0, a probability distribution over its immediate followers.
• for each i a partition of X i into k(i) information sets, hil , hi2 , ••• , hik(i) · The set of player i's information sets by H i .
• a set of available actions, Aii , associated with each information set, and the union of all these actions over all information sets is denoted Ai.
• a payoff function for each player, u i that assigns a real number to each element of z.
For each terminal node z E Z there is a unique path connecting the initial node, which consists of a sequence of moves by one or more players. We will assume throughout that the game has perfect recall. That is, every player knows his past actions and knows everything he knew at any of his previous information sets.
A behavior strategy for player i E I is a function bi : Hi -+ M(Ai) satisfying bi(hij) E M(Aii) for all i and for all hij E Hi , where M(C) indicates the set of all probability mea.Sures over the set C. For hij E Hi we use the shorthand bij = bi (hij)· For each a E Aij , bij (a) denotes the probability of action a. Let Bi denote the set of all behavior strategies for player i, and B = TiieN Bi be the set of behavior strategy n tuples. A pure strategy for i is a behavior strategy that assigns a degenerate probability distribution to each hij E Hi .
The idea of a logit equilibrium in an extensive form game is the same as in the normal form model, except that the logit response probabilities are defined on the con ditional expected payoffs at a decision node, and a version of sequential rationality is automatically13 imposed. Given a behavior strategy, b, and any information set hij , and any action aijk E Aij we can define the conditional distribution over the terminal nodes for that ·action. From .tJiis conditional distribution over terminal nodes, we can compute the expected payoff for each aijk E Aij , conditional on reaching Aij . Denote this by v( aijk i b). Then the logit model simply requires that the probability of choosing aijk at information set hij is given-by A Logit Equilibrium in the extensive form, is any b satisfying this equation for all i, j, a' E Aii· We .also refer to this as the Agent liogit Equilibrium, because it can be justified as a Bayesian equilibrium of the agent model14 of the extensive form game, in 13It is automatically imposed, in the sense that the logit model implies all decision nodes can be reached, and players are responding to their conditional payoffs .
14In the agent version of an extensive form game, each information set of a player is interpreted as a different agent of that player, but all agents of the same player share identical preferences over the terminal nodes. Table 5 . Normal form of simple ultimatum game .
. which the payoff perturbations are with respect to each of the conditional payoffs of each agent at each information set. Thus it is as if the different agents of a player observe different information, which none of the other players, including the other agents of the same player, observe. The Bayesian equilibria of such a game, when the perturbations are distributed according to a double exponential distribution with parameter ,\, are equivalent (in terms of path probabilities) to the logit equilibria.
Example: The invariance principle
An interesting feature of the logit equilibrium in extensive forms is that it depends on "inessential" transformations15 of the extensive form. Thus it predicts different patterns of behavior for strategically equivalent games. A nice example of this is the simple ultimatum game, with J = 2. Consider the game being played in two stages. In the first stage, the first mover makes an offer of either (2, 2), or (3, 1) . If the equal split is offered, the second mover must accept it. Otherwise, the second mover can either accept or reject. The normal form of this game is given in Table 5 and the extensive form is given in Figure 6 . The logit equilibrium correspondence of the normal form 16 of this game is shown in Figure 7a , and Figure 7b below shows the unique extensive form logit equilibrium.
Two comparisons are noteworthy. First, the equilibrium correspondence is unique for the sequentially played version of the game and is not unique for the simultaneous version. Second, for all values of ,\, the logit equilibrium (both of them, in fact) in the simultaneous version of the game has a higher probability of a fair offer than the sequential version of the game. This occurs because for all values of ,\ the conditional probability Player 2 will rej ect an unfair offer is higher in the simultaneous version. The intuition for this is simple. In the simultaneous move version , the . conditional expected utility difference between Player 3's two strategies is less than in the sequential version, 15 An inessential transformation of a game in extensive form produces another game which has the same reduced normal form.
16This is also the extensive form logit equilibrium correspondence for the extensive form game in which Player 2 must choose whether or not to reject an unfair offer, before observing the offer. For this reason, we refer to this version of the game as the simultaneous play version, and the other as the sequential play version since Player 2 does not know Player 1 's offer at the time he chooses his strategy. Thus the probability of the worse of the two strategies (rejecting unfair offers) is higher in the simultaneous version.
This latter observation is discussed in greater detail in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995b) . That paper also analyzes some experiments by Schotter, Weigelt, and Wilson (1994) that provide empirical support for these effects of inessential transformations of the game.
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Concluding remarks
This paper presented a statistical framework for modelling equilibria in noncooperative games. The framework blends the ideas from Nash equilibrium and Harsanyi's notion of Bayesian equilibrium with standard statistical models of discrete choice. Besides provid ing new insights into behavior in games, this model provides a potentially useful tool for the econometrics of game theory.
The framework can be easily applied to data analysis as a tool for estimation and testing. This is discussed in detail in Palfrey (1995a, 1995b) , which illustrates this with a number of specific applications using experimental data sets. This econometric approach is in the same category of applications to data from experimental games as El-Gamal et al. (1993) , Palfrey (1994a, 1994b) and McKelvey and Palfrey (t99 2), although those papers did not model the statistical component of behavior as varying monotonically in the expected payoffs.
A number of theoretical insights can be drawn from this model. First, it provides a unique equilibrium selection in generic games. Second, it predicts systematic differences in equilibrium behavior compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium or some al ternative refinements of Nash equilibrium. This was illustrated with discrete versions and Palfrey (1995b) successfully apply this theory to explain why unintuitive sequential equilibria are played in certain experimental signaling games (Banks et al. 1994 , Brandts and Holt 1992 , 1993 . These systematic differences from Nash equilibrium also imply systematic deviations from the "invariance principle" that behavior should be the same in two different extensive form games as long as they have the same reduced normal form (Kohlberg, E. and J.-F. Metens, 1986) .
Finally, there are several directions to extend this framework, some of which were dis cussed briefly above. These include allowing for heterogeneity, continuous action spaces, learning, and private information.
